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Skill	and	Expertise	in	Perception*	Susanna	Siegel	Forthcoming	in	Routledge	Handbook	of	Skill	and	Expertise,		Edited	by	Ellen	Fridland	and	Carlotta	Pavese.			We	can	distinguish	theses	that	connect	skill	with	perception	in	general	from	theses	that	connect	skill	with	perceptual	experience	in	particular.	Perceptual	experiences	are	the	conscious	states	and	episodes	that	are	characteristic	of	perception.	These	experiences	are	sensitive	to	how	one’s	attention	is	distributed.	One	can	undergo	perceptual	experiences	both	in	cases	when	the	experience	leads	to	knowledge,	or	in	hallucination	or	illusion.	By	contrast,	perception	in	general	includes	both	perceptual	experiences	and	the	unconscious	information	processes	that	give	rise	to	them	via	the	perceptual	system.	So	there	is	more	to	perception	than	perceptual	experience.	The	focus	of	this	entry	is	the	relationship	of	skills	to	perceptual	experience.		How	are	perceptual	experiences	related	to	skills?	According	to	some	researchers,	skills	can	be	exercised	only	in	intentional	actions.	But	when	discussing	the	relationship	between	skills	and	perceptual	experience,	it’s	useful	to	work	with	a	broader	notion	of	skill	that	could	count	as	skilled	behavior	the	exercise	of	some	recognitional	abilities	that	don’t	involve	intentional	action,	such	visually	recognizing	avocadoes,	or	your	favorite	sheep	in	the	flock,	or	the	sound	of	A-flat,	without	antecedently	intending	to	do	any	of	these	things.	The	broader	notion	of	skill	includes	these	forms	of	expertise.		It’s	clear	that	perceptual	experience	plays	a	central	role	in	skilled	behavior	of	all	kinds.	It	is	difficult	(if	not	impossible)	to	catch	a	football	if	you	can’t	see	or	otherwise	feel	it	coming,	or	to	play	chess	while	blindfolded,	or	to	recognize	your	favorite	sheep	without	getting	any	sensory	input.	At	a	minimum,	perceptual	experience	enables	these	forms	of	skilled	action.		Some	philosophers	go	farther	and	suggest	that	perceptual	experience	is	itself	a	kind	of	skilled	action,	or	that	it	constitutively	involves	skilled	actions	of	various	kinds.	Whether	or	not	any	version	of	this	further	claim	is	true,	there	are	several	important	ways	in	which	perceptual	experiences	might	be	thought	to	manifest	a	subject’s	skills.	This	entry	focuses	on	three	of	them.	Section	1	discusses	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	consists	in	motor	skills.	Second	2	focuses	on	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	can	consist	partly	in	skilled	mental	actions	of	recognition,	such	as	recognizing	a	particular	animal	scurrying	past	as	a	mouse.	Section	3	reviews	some	of	the	main	ways	that	various	kinds	of	expertise	or	cultural	understanding	manifest	themselves	in	patterns	of	perceptual	attention.																																																														*	Thanks	to	Kevin	Connolly,	Kati	Farkas,	Ellen	Fridland,	Zoe	Jenkin,	Samantha	Matherne,	Matthew	McGrath,	Jessie	Munton,	and	Carlotta	Pavese	for	criticism	and	discussion.	
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1.	Are	motor	skills	constitutive	of	perceptual	experience?	The	20th	century	French	phenomenologist	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	analyzed	perceptual	experience	as	necessarily	engaging	motor	skills.	In	Merleau-Ponty’s	paradigmatic	cases	of	perception,	the	flow	of	information	taken	in	by	perceivers	is	inseparable	from	the	way	they	move	through	a	scene.	On	this	view,	even	superficially	static	perceptions	engage	motor	skills,	such	as	seeing	the	color	of	a	table	as	uniform	when	different	parts	of	it	are	differently	illuminated.	By	analogy,	in	a	dance,	the	dancers’	movements	are	unified	in	their	intake	of	kinesthetic,	tactile,	visual	and	auditory	information	to	such	an	extent	that	any	purely	sensory	dimensions	of	the	dancing	process	would	be	hard	to	factor	out	from	motor	dimensions.	Merleau-Ponty’s	focus	on	roles	of	the	body	in	perceptual	experience	has	inspired	some	contemporary	thinkers	to	construe	the	sensory	and	motor	dimensions	of	perceptual	experience	as	best	understood	as	a	unit,	just	as	they	are	in	dancing	(Hurley	1998,	Kelly	1999,	Noë	2005).			How	far	could	this	model	plausibly	generalize?	Watching	a	sunset	or	examining	the	colors	of	paint	are	other	paradigms	of	perception,	but	they	apparently	need	not	involve	doing	much	with	one’s	body.	Because	one	is	just	looking,	these	experiences	are	more	like	taking	in	a	spectacle	than	actively	creating	one.	Some	followers	of	Merleau-Ponty	try	to	make	the	case	that	even	color	perception	involves	the	bodily	activity	of	finding	what	Merleau-Ponty	called	the	optimal	point	of	view	from	which	the	color	–	or	anything	-	should	be	viewed.1	According	to	these	interpreters,	we	gravitate	toward	optimal	viewpoints,	and	finding	these	optima	is	a	skill	on	par	with	knowing	how	to	walk:	it	is	a	learned	skill	that	we	are	innately	disposed	to	develop.			What	kind	of	evidence	could	support	the	idea	that	we	are	sensitive	to	visual	optima?	The	main	evidence	would	seem	to	be	behavioral	dispositions	to	gravitate	toward	optimal	viewpoints	and	feel	uncomfortable	with	suboptimal	ones.	But	if	perceptual	experience	in	general	consists	in	exercising	the	skill	of	finding	optimum	viewpoints,	and	if	different	qualities	(color,	shape,	motion	and	so	on)	each	have	their	own	optimum,	then	we	will	often	have	competing	dispositions.	And	if	that’s	our	situation,	or	if	for	all	we	know	it	is	our	situation,	then	we	cannot	straightforwardly	take	the	behavior	we	find	in	others,	or	the	discomfort	we	feel	in	ourselves,	to	be	the	manifestation	of	dispositions	to	move	toward	the	optimum.	There	is	no	obvious	feedback	that	indicates	which	behavior	meets	the	optima.	And	if	there	are	neither	phenomenological	nor	behavioral	markers	of	such	optima,	for	many	forms	of	perception	there	are	no	obvious	success	conditions	for	perceiving	optimally.	So	even	if	Dreyfus	and	Kelly’s	approach	captures	an	aspect	of	some	perceptual	experiences	when	they	are	deeply	integrated	with	bodily	action,	the	analysis	of	these	aspects	may	not	support	the	broader	idea	that	perceptual	experience	is	constitutively	an	exercise	of	skilled	bodily	action.	Here’s	a	case	where	skills	are	construed	as	manifesting	in	dispositions	to	navigate	the	social	and	physical	environment	in	a	way	that	others	would	be	legible	to	others	in	that	environment,	rather	than	as		an	intentional	action.																																																										1	S.	Kelly	1999,	2005,	H.	Dreyfus	2002,	2005.	
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	Dreyfus	and	Kelly	focus	on	the	optimal	viewpoints	in	analyzing	Merleau-Ponty’s	idea	of	the	intentional	arc.	In	developing	this	idea,	Merleau-Ponty	brings	into	focus	a	whole	range	of	mental	states	that	situate	us	in	social	and	physical	environments.	As	he	puts	it,	the	intentional	arc	is	that	set	of	representations	by	which	we	“project	around	us	our	past,	our	future,	our	human	milieu,	our	physical	situation,	our	ideological	situation,	and	our	moral	situation,	or	rather,	that	ensures	that	we	are	situated	within	all	of	these	relationships”.2					Merleau-Ponty	construes	the	intentional	arc	as	an	embodied	mode	of	intentionality.	According	to	him,	our	motor	dispositions	embody	a	kind	of	understanding	of	the	things	we	perceive	(perhaps	optima	would	be	but	one	example).	For	example,	in	the	social	realm,	the	culturally	specific	boundaries	of	personal	space	regulate	how	close	we	stand	to	one	another,	and	how	far	we	can	squish	together	on	a	subway	without	feeling	that	boundaries	have	been	violated	(Kelly	2005).	Our	bodily	stances	also	communicate	cues	of	social	status	and	relationships,	such	as	authority,	deference,	and	confidence.	Exhibiting	and	interpreting	these	cues	is	a	form	of	cultural	literacy,	expressed	through	the	body,	and	it	constitutively	engages	perceptual	experience.		On	this	analysis,	perceptual	experience	constitutively	includes	skills	of	navigating	the	social	and	physical	environment,	rather	than	being	a	representation	that	mediates	between	sub-personal	perceptual	inputs	and	behavioral	outputs,	in	conjunction	with	other	beliefs,	desires	and	preferences.	The	unit	of	analysis	here	is	something	that	both	has	a	phenomenological	feel	and	consists	in	a	set	of	dispositions	to	respond	to	cultural	and	physical	environments	in	culturally	recognizable	ways.3		If	Merleau-Ponty	is	correct,	then	cultural	literacy	is	mediated	by	attention,	including	joint	attention.	This	prediction	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	is	independently	plausible.	Like	other	primates,	humans	follow	the	gaze	of	their	con-specifics	to	direct	their	attention	across	all	sorts	of	scenarios.4	Gaze-following	is	part	of	joint	attention,	in	which	person	A	attends	can	tell	by	perception	what	person	B	is	attending	to,	and	person	A	goes	on	to	attend	to	it	as	well.	In	this	way,	person	B’s	attention	directs	person	A’s	attention.	Joint	attention	is	a	fundamentally	social	form	of	perception	and	it	provides	a	basis	for	human	cooperation.	Just	think	of	how	your	attention	has	to	be	coordinated	with	another	person’s,	if	you	are	going	to	carry	a	table	down	a	flight	of	stairs,	or	pass	each	other	a	narrow	path,	or	carry	on	a	conversation.	Actors	in	cooperative	human	activities	typically	have	to	presume	that	they	can	direct	their	cooperants’	attention	to	the	relevant	part	of	the	flow	of	information.	For	these	reasons,	joint	attention	is	part	of	the	basis	on	which	Merleau-Ponty’s	intentional	arc	could	unfold.																																																										2	Merleau-Ponty	(PhP)	137.	For	further	analysis,	see	Matherne	(2017)	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	notion	of	style.	3	Noe	and	O’Regan	(2001)	4	Eilan	et	al.	(2015)	
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	Independently	of	the	picture	inspired	by	Merleau-Ponty	on	which	perceptual	experience	is	infused	with	motor	skills,	we	can	also	zoom	in	on	more	piecemeal	recognitional	abilities	and	consider	their	relationships	to	perceptual	experience.	This	brings	us	to	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	could	be	constituted	wholly	or	in	part	by	exercising	abilities	to	recognize	things,	where	recognition	is	construed	as	a	mental	action.			
2.	Are	recognitional	dispositions	ever	constitutive	of	perceptual	experience?	Chances	are	good	that	you	can	recognize	avocados	by	sight,	or	your	housemate’s	footsteps	on	the	stairs	by	the	patterns	of	sound,	or	coffee	brewing	by	its	smell.	What	kind	of	knowledge	do	you	have,	when	you	know	what	avocados	look	like,	or	when	you	know	what	someone’s	footsteps	sound	like,	or	what	coffee	smells	like?		A	first	possibility	is	that	you	have	some	articulable	knowledge	detailing	the	features	by	which	you	can	recognize	avocados.	Even	if	you	had	never	seen	avocados	before,	someone	could	describe	them	to	you,	and	you	could	learn	from	them	that	avocados	are	oval,	and	than	depending	on	the	variety	they	have	either	blackish	thick	skin	with	knobby	texture,	or	greenish	thin	skin	that’s	relatively	smooth.	In	this	way,	you	could	know	this	is	what	avocados	look	like,	even	if	you	had	never	actually	seen	one.						A	second	possibility	is	that	your	knowledge	of	what	things	look	like	could	consist	ultimately	in	an	ability	to	recognize	them	(as	per	Lewis	1990).	For	instance,	if	housemate	Jack	has	a	bad	knee,	it	might	give	his	gait	a	distinctive	rhythm	that	you	can	recognize	when	you	hear	it.	A	rhythmic	sophisticate	might	know	that	the	interval	in	between	the	sound	of	the	left	foot	stepping	and	the	sounds	of	the	right	foot	landing	is	one-and-a-half	times	longer	than	the	interval	between	right	foot	stepping	and	left	foot	landing,	and	might	be	able	to	describe	the	sound	of	Jack’s	steps	to	you	even	if	neither	of	you	had	ever	heard	any	gait	like	that.	But	let’s	suppose	that	you’re	not	a	rhythmic	sophisticate,	and	that	no	one	has	ever	described	anyone’s	gait	to	you	before.	You	still	might	simply	know	how	to	identify	Jack	on	the	basis	of	the	sound	of	his	footsteps.		Your	knowledge	would	consist	in	an	ability	to	recognize	Jack.	If	you	lacked	the	ability,	then	on	this	analysis,	you	would	lack	the	knowledge	as	well.				Let’s	focus	on	this	second	option,	and	call	it	the	purely	practical	one.5		Is	perceptual	experience	then	constituted	either	by	acquiring	or	by	exercising	such	abilities?	If	so,	then	that	may	be	because	perceptual	experience	is	partly	constituted	by	having	these	abilities,	in	which	case	we	have	an	example	of	the	thesis	that	perceptual	experience	is	constituted	by	a	type	of	mental	action.																																																													5	Matherne	(2014)	argues	that	this	position	is	found	in	Kant.	Pavese	(2015)	defends	a	mixed	view.	For	useful	discussion	of	perceptual	recognition	in	general,	see	Brewer	(2011),	McGrath	(2017)	and	Millar	(2019).	
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Alternatively,	what	if	perceptual	experience	is	purely	an	occasion	for	exercising	recognitional	abilities?	Sometimes	we	have	a	concept,	such	as	rose,	and	we	have	the	disposition	to	recognize	roses,	but	we	fail	to	apply	the	concept	to	a	rose	we	encounter.	Kant	described	this	type	of	situation	when	discussing	a	physician	who	sometimes	makes	errors	of	judgment.6	If	this	situation	can	arise	with	every	concept	we	have,	then	recognition	and	perceptual	experience	are	only	contingently	connected.			This	type	of	contingency	can	occur	in	different	strengths.	Its	strongest	form	allows	that	perceptual	experience	never	constitutively	involves	the	application	of	any	recognitional	dispositions	at	all.		In	that	case,	perceptual	experiences	enables	recognition	of	things,	but	is	not	constituted	by	recognitional	abilities,	even	in	part.		In	a	weaker	form,	in	every	perceptual	experience,	some	recognitional	dispositions	are	exercised,	but	no	recognitional	disposition	that	is	guaranteed	to	be	exercised	on	every	occasion	on	which	it	would	be	fitting	to	do	so.	This	weak	form	reintroduces	a	type	of	constitutive	link	between	perceptual	experiences	and	recognitional	dispositions.		Just	as	we	can	ask	how	perceptual	experience	relates	to	practical	ability	to	recognize		things	like	roses,	we	can	ask	a	parallel	question	about	the	relationship	between	perceptual	experiences	and	introspection.	When	you	know	what	it’s	like	to	see	red,	you	know	something	about	the	character	of	a	type	of	visual	experience.	In	Frank	Jackson’s	thought	experiment,	a	neuroscientist	Mary	who	is	said	to	know	all	the	physical	facts	sees	red	for	the	first	time	after	living	in	a	black	and	white	room.	What	does	Mary	come	to	know,	when	she	learns	what	it’s	like	to	see	red?	According	to	some	philosophers,	knowing	what	it’s	like	to	see	red	is	ultimately	a	kind	of	ability	to	self-ascribe	a	phenomenal	type	of	experience.7	If	they	are	right,	then	knowing	what	it’s	like	to	have	this	type	of	color	experience	is	an	irreducibly	practical	ability.			
3.		How	can	perceptual	attention	reflect	the	subject’s	skill?	There	are	many	ways	in	which	specialized	expertise	including	modes	of	being	culturally	embedded	can	manifest	itself	in	patterns	of	attention.																																																											6	Kant	imagines	a	physician,	judge	or	statesman	who	“can	have	many	fine	pathological,	juridical,	or	political	rules	in	his	head,	of	which	he	can	even	be	a	thorough	teacher,	and	yet	can	easily	stumble	in	their	application,	either	because	he	is	lacking	in	the	natural	power	of	judgment	(though	not	in	understanding),	and	to	be	sure	understands	the	universal	in	abstracto	but	cannot	distinguish	whether	a	case	in	
concreto	belongs	under	it,	or	also	because	he	has	not	received	adequate	training	for	this	judgment	through	examples	and	actual	business”	KrV	A134/B173.	Matherne	(2014)	discusses	this	example	in	connection	with	perceptual	experience.		7	Lewis	(1990)	
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When	you	perceive	a	scene,	your	attention	is	always	distributed	in	a	way	that	puts	some	things	into	the	foreground	and	other	thing	into	the	periphery.	How	your	attention	is	distributed	can	depend	on	other	factors	as	well,	including	whether	the	scene	contains	the	types	of	stimuli	that	“grab”	your	attention,	such	as	a	sudden	movements,	bright	flashes,	loud	bangs,	or	unexpected	behavior.			It	can	also	depend	on	what	you’re	already	in	the	midst	of	doing,	and	on	how	well	you	know	how	to	do	it.	For	instance,	a	softball	player	at	the	bat	knows	where	to	look	to	figure	out	what	kind	of	pitch	is	coming	and	how	best	to	hit	it.	A	pickpocket	observing	a	potential	victim	knows	which	gestures	indicate	where	the	victim	keeps	his	wallet,	and	whether	he	is	sufficiently	distracted	not	to	notice	a	hand	reaching	in	to	take	it	out.	Someone	lacking	expertise	in	thievery	who	is	watching	the	very	same	man	could	easily	have	no	idea	where	his	wallet	is,	let	alone	how	to	snatch	it.				Distributions	of	attention	can	also	depend	on	scientific	expertise.	Faced	with	the	same	sequence	of	x-ray	images,	a	radiologist	and	a	novice	will	parse	each	image	differently.	To	the	radiologist,	some	patterns	of	lines	and	light	contrast	stand	out	from	others,	whereas	the	novice	finds	no	difference	in	kind	between	them.	The	radiologist’s	expertise	allows	her	to	find	the	tumors	in	the	image.		She	knows	what	to	look	for,	and	she	knows	when	she	has	found	it.	And	moving	down	a	continuum	from	scientific	expertise	to	expertise	gained	merely	by	exposure,	someone	used	to	seeing	toads	is	better	than	someone	with	less	exposure	to	at	finding	a	toad	camouflaged	on	a	tree.8			The	18th-century	Scottish	philosopher	Thomas	Reid	observed	that	patterns	of	exposure	to	things	could	lead	perceivers	to	differentiate	between	properties	that	previously	were	indistinguishable	to	them.		For	example,	a	wine	ignoramus	may	taste	no	difference	between	five	different	wines,	whereas	a	wine	expert	can	tell	them	apart.	A	birder	can	see	the	visible	differences	between	two	kinds	of	ducks,	whereas	a	duck	novice	can’t	tell	them	apart.9	Pairs	of	phonemes	that	sound	different	to	speakers	of	a	language	sound	the	same	to	people	who	don’t	understand	that	language.	In	these	ways,	expertise	can	improve	perceptual	acuity.				Expertise	in	birds,	wine,	and	language	improves	the	overall	epistemic	position	of	the	experts	in	these	examples.	But	in	other	contexts,	selective	improvement	in	acuity	introduces	perceptual	asymmetries	that	highlight	epistemic	limitations.	The	prime	example	is	facial	differentiation.	In	racially	segregated	parts	of	the	United	States,	the	most	lengthy	and	socially	valued	interactions	occur	primarily	among	people	who	share	a	socially	designated	‘race’.	People	who	are	designated	regularly	as	belonging	a	racial	category,	such	as	white,	and	who	interact	mainly	with	the	same	are	much	better	at	visually	discriminating	between	different	white	faces,	and	much	worse	at																																																									8	This	observation	about	toads	is	an	instance	of	the	general	claim	that	being	used	to	seeing	F’s	gives	you	a	facility	at	perceptually	distinguishing	F’s	from	their	background.	For	discussion,	see	Goldstone	(2015)	and	Connolly	(2019).	9	Pylyshyn,	Z.	1999,	Goldstone	(2015),	Connolly	(2019).	
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visually	discriminating	between	faces	of	people	belonging	to	other	races.10	This	pattern	of	interaction	has	an	adverse	effect	on	the	ability	to	discriminate	between	faces	of	the	people	belonging	to	the	socially	designated	“races”	with	whom	they	do	not	interact.		When	new	abilities	to	differentiate	within	a	category	(such	as	faces,	wines,	or	birds)	emerge	from	a	long	pattern	of	exposure	to	instances	of	that	category,	the	process	is	known	as	perceptual	learning.11	Perceptual	learning	differs	from	perceptual	development,	which	is	a	matter	of	brain	maturation.	Even	the	most	mature	perceptual	systems	can	undergo	perceptual	learning.				When	a	perceiver’s	acuity	within	a	category	increases	due	to	perceptual	learning,	her	perceptual	experiences	reflect	both	her	ability	to	differentiate	and	her	past	pattern	of	exposure	to	instances	of	the	category.						Perceptual	learning	is	most	often	illustrated	by	improved	acuity	in	categorization.	But	the	general	idea	that	long-term	changes	in	acuity	can	result	from	practice	and	experience	applies	to	perception	of	structures	as	well.	Gaining	practice	and	expertise	in	music,	for	example,	can	improve	the	ability	to	find	the	beat	in	a	piece	of	music	and	keep	track	of	it.	A	beat	is	the	temporal	structure	of	a	piece	of	music.	It	may	or	may	not	have	an	audible	expression	(for	instance	in	the	pattern	of	sounds	made	by	a	drumbeat).	A	long-term	change	in	sensitivity	to	this	kind	of	temporal	structure	due	to	patterns	of	exposure	or	practice	trying	to	find	the	beat	belongs	to	the	same	family	of	perceptual	influences	as	improvements	in	acuity	within	a	category.12					Aside	from	categorization	and	differentiation,	perceptual	learning	in	an	extended	sense	can	take	the	form	of	social	facility	in	a	culture.	In	any	human	interaction	among	adults,	some	possibilities	of	interaction	are	foregrounded	and	others	are	backgrounded,	and	normally	it	is	commonly	known	what	the	main	options	are	for	how	the	situation	is	likely	to	unfold.	For	instance,	it	is	possible	to	learn	the	social	cues	that	someone	wants	to	shake	your	hand,	catch	your	eye,	talk	to	you,	or	avoid	you,	and	these	possibilities	of	interactions	are	learned	and	can	be	culturally	specific.			Another	way	for	cultural	embeddings	to	shape	perceptual	experience	brings	us	back	to	joint	attention.	Alongside	its	role	in	social	coordination,	joint	attention	is	also	a	means	by	which	people	develop	sensitivity	of	social	value.	Adams	and	Kveraga	(2015)	present	experimental	evidence	that	in	the	United	States,	the	extent	of	gaze-																																																								10	This	effect	is	known	as	the	cross-race	effect.	For	an	overview	see	Meissner,	C.A	et	al	(2001).	
11	Goldstone	(2015),	Connolly	(2017)	[sep]	12	On	rhythm	perception,	see	Boll-Avetisyan,	N	et	al	(2017).		
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following	behavior	is	sometimes	sensitive	to	race	and	social	power.	To	a	statistically	significant	degree,	Americans	of	European	descent	(white	participants)	followed	the	gaze	of	white	faces	but	did	not	follow	the	gaze	of	Americans	of	African	descent	(black	participants),	whereas	black	participants	followed	the	gaze	of	both	groups	of	faces.	To	the	extent	that	gaze-following	indicates	confidence	that	the	followed-person’s	object	of	attention,	or	experience	of	it,	is	epistemically	valuable,	it	is	reasonable	to	hypothesize	that	this	result	reflects	an	underlying	pattern	of	social	valuation,	and	specifically	the	epistemic	under-valuation	of	black	adults	by	white	adults.		Merleau-Ponty	would	predict	that	a	person’s	cultural	embedding	can	affect	distributions	of	attention,	and	this	prediction	too	is	borne	out.	Eberhardt	(2003)	found	that	the	cultural	stereotype	that	associates	black	men	and	crime	becomes	a	‘visual	tuning	device’	that	directs	attention	in	toward	stereotype-congruent	information,	and	away	from	stereotype-incongruent	information.13		For	instance,	in	one	experimental	paradigm,	participants	were	primed	with	the	face	of	a	man	and	then	shown	a	series	of	image	that	gradually	morphed	into	a	clear	image	from	a	noisy	one.	Participants	find	crime-related	objects	such	as	guns	and	knives	at	a	lower	threshold	after	seeing	the	face	of	a	man	who	is	black,	compared	to	the	threshold	at	which	they	report	such	objects	after	seeing	the	face	of	a	man	who	is	white.	And	when	the	primed	face	is	black,	participants	find	crime-related	objects	at	a	lower	threshold	than	they	find	non-crime	related	objects	such	as	watches	or	bugles.			In	another	experimental	paradigm	involving	a	‘dot-probe’	task,	participants	are	first	quickly	shown	a	subliminal	crime-related	prime,	such	as	a	picture	of	a	gun,	fingerprint,	police	badge,	or	handcuff.	The	image	is	flashed	too	quickly	for	them	to	report	what	they	see.	They	are	then	shown	two	male	faces,	one	black	and	one	white,	and	after	the	faces	disappear,	a	dot	appears	in	the	place	where	one	of	the	two	faces	was	shown.	With	a	crime	prime,	participants	find	the	dot	more	quickly	when	it	replaces	black	male	face,	compared	to	when	it	replaces	a	white	male	face,	and	compared	to	when	there	is	no	prime	at	all.	Eberhardt	takes	this	experiment	to	show	that	crime	prime	directs	attention	to	black	male	faces.	Here,	culturally	entrenched	stereotypes	produce	associations	that	in	turn	facilitate	patterns	of	attention	that	reflect	those	stereotypes.		Finally,	both	ethical	and	aesthetic	engagement	can	take	the	form	of	patterns	of	attention	as	well,	and	in	these	ways,	perceptual	skills	are	central	to	both	ethics	and	aesthetics.	Consider	a	long	and	complicated	piece	of	classical	music.	Musically	engaged	people	can	direct	their	attention	to	structures	within	the	music,	distinguishing	a	theme	from	its	development,	and	finding	other	aesthetically	relevant	features	of	the	music.	When	attention	is	distributed	this	way,	the	musically	important	features	of	the	symphony	are	made	salient	(a	point	emphasized	by	Nanay	2015). In	ethics,	as	philosopher	and	novelist	Iris	Murdoch	emphasized,	in	some	cases,	acting	well	consists	in	part	in	noticing	the	good-making	or	bad-making																																																									13	For	some	criticisms	of	statistical	analysis	in	Eberhardt’s	study,	see	Francis	2016.	
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features	of	a	scene,	or	the	features	that	call	for	specific	kinds	of	moral	action,	such	as	giving	up	one’s	seat	on	a	bus	for	someone	who	needs	it	more	badly.	One	could	see	these	dispositions	as	a	kind	of	moral	skill	in	the	form	of	perception,	an	idea	developed	at	length	in	a	quite	different	ways	by	Bengson	et	al	(forthcoming),	Fridland	2017,	Mandelbaum	1955,	and	Murdoch	1967.14		 		
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